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Abstract
In August 1968, the Soviet Union sent troops into 
Czechoslovakia to crush the burgeoning spirit of reform 
known as the “Prague Spring .” The Soviet invasion and the 
return of oppressive government measures triggered the 
flight of twenty-seven thousand people, eleven thousand 
of whom came to Canada . Using newly released archival 
records, this paper explores how the Canadian government 
approached the refugee crisis and argues that confident offi-
cials, buoyed by a charismatic leader and operating in an 
era of improved East-West relations, manipulated the con-
ventional definition of a refugee and consciously adopted 
policies that enabled large numbers of Czechoslovakian 
refugees to resettle in Canada .
Résumé
En août 1968, l’Union soviétique envoie des troupes en 
Tchécoslovaquie pour écraser l’esprit de réforme en plein 
essor dit du « Printemps de Prague . » L’invasion soviétique 
et le retour de l’oppression étatique ont entraîné la fuite de 
vingt-sept mille personnes, dont onze mille sont venues au 
Canada . À l’aide de documents d’archives nouvellement 
rendus publics, l’auteur étudie la réaction du gouverne-
ment canadien à cette crise des réfugiés et soutient que les 
autorités, confiantes, soutenues par un leader charisma-
tique et opérant dans une atmosphère d’amélioration des 
relations Est-Ouest, ont manipulé la définition acceptée de 
réfugié et consciemment adopté des politiques qui ont per-
mis à grand nombre de réfugiés tchécoslovaques de s’ins-
taller au Canada .
In the wake of the 1968 invasion, the vast majority of the new-
comers to the West did not undergo the risk of combating the 
Iron Curtain in the darkness of the Sumava forest; rather they 
arrived with passports and often by car, fully loaded.1
Introduction
In August 1968, Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau 
was vacationing in Spain, enjoying the warm sun and sav-
ouring the fine food of the region. In a very different part 
of Europe, Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops were massing on 
the borders of Czechoslovakia, preparing to put an end to 
the period of blossoming freedom and intellectual ferment 
known as the “Prague Spring.” The Soviet invasion was a 
brutal reminder that the Cold War conflict, which seemed 
to have abated with the rise of détente in the early 1960s, 
had not yet been resolved. The invasion caused the flight of 
many thousands of Czechoslovakians and invited the possi-
bility that Canada, and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), would respond militarily to the vio-
lence. What would Canada do? Would it go to war to pro-
tect the borders of an independent nation? Would it help the 
refugees? The first option was never seriously considered but 
the issue of refugees framed much of the debate around the 
Canadian response to the crisis. This article explores how 
the Canadian government approached the refugee crisis 
in 1968 and argues that officials, buoyed by a charismatic 
leader and operating in an era of improved East-West rela-
tions, manipulated the conventional definition of a refugee 
and consciously adopted policies that enabled large numbers 
of Czechoslovakian refugees to resettle in Canada.
In doing so, this article takes the concept of “agency” and 
applies it to state officials rather than the migrants who were 
subject to their decisions. For the past ten years, scholars 
have revised the historic representation of refugees, turning 
to categories of analysis that acknowledge greater decision-
making agency on the part of those individuals who choose 
to abandon situations of violence, poverty, and inequality.2 
This emphasis on choice has caused the traditional image 
of the persecuted refugee to be replaced with someone who, 
rather than being forced to leave, makes a conscious deci-
sion to do so.3 Increasingly, the line between an economic 
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migrant (someone who moves for employment or busi-
ness opportunities) and a refugee is blurring: “technically, 
refugees flee to save their lives, and migrants to improve 
their economic prospects; but distinguishing between them 
becomes difficult when people flee from countries where 
poverty and violence are direct consequences of the polit-
ical system.”4 This article argues that governments, along 
with migrants, contribute to this convergence with impli-
cations for how countries of resettlement perceive, and 
prepare for, potential migrants. As a result, refugee agency 
must be understood against the reality that regardless of 
how much an individual can manipulate official categories 
of migration for their own purposes, the ultimate decision 
regarding their legal entry and resettlement still rests with 
the nation-state.
The movement of people from East to West between 
1945 and 1989 provided an opportunity for committed 
anti-Communist governments to score strategic propa-
ganda victories. Mass refugee movements, individual 
asylum seekers, and celebrated exiles were exploited to 
demonize repressive regimes in the Eastern bloc and simul-
taneously demonstrate the greatness of democratic soci-
eties. Governments in Western settler countries such as 
Canada, Australia, and the United States, with long trad-
itions of using immigration policy to build nations in their 
own image, responded to the plight of the refugees based 
on the twin desires to communicate a message on the world 
stage and to advance the economic and social development 
of their nations. When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary 
in 1956, it created the first major exodus of “freedom fight-
ers” to the Western bloc. Canada arranged for the transpor-
tation and settlement of thirty-seven thousand Hungarians 
in the largest single refugee movement to the country up to 
that point. It was a huge humanitarian effort and a major 
propaganda victory.
A decade later, the “Cold War refugees” of 1968 were 
seen quite differently by countries in the West. In Canada, 
officials viewed the “refugees” through the generous and 
optimistic lens of accommodation with the Soviet Union 
and stepped back from using the humanitarian crisis for 
propaganda purposes. Based on new archival evidence, 
this article shows how aid was extended based on national 
interests defined predominantly by labour and economic 
needs.5 Discussions amongst officials in the Departments 
of Manpower and Immigration and External Affairs show 
that moderate views of the Soviet Union and a pragmatic 
view of migration policy as enshrined in the newly minted 
1967 Immigration Act determined the nature of Canadian 
aid to the Czechoslovakians who fled the Soviet violence in 
1968. In the process, the very essence of who, and what, the 
Canadian state considered a refugee was transformed.
Conceptualizing Choice
The legal concept of a refugee emerged after the Second World 
War when organizations such as the Intergovernmental 
Committee on European Migration (ICEM) and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were 
established to deal with the fallout of millions of displaced 
people. Concern for and a desire to protect the most vul-
nerable of people encouraged the growth of an inter-
national refugee regime, which was enshrined in the 1951 
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention) and the associated 1967 Protocol.6 The 
term “Convention Refugee,” which places the onus on indi-
viduals having a “fear of persecution” to merit resettlement, 
has been manipulated by countries since its introduction, 
interpreted according to each signatory’s legislative frame-
work. In some countries entire bureaucracies have sprung 
up, dedicated solely to implementing the Convention. In 
others, only certain aspects of the Convention have been 
incorporated into national immigration laws, often in an ad 
hoc manner.7 In tandem with these changes, the ideological 
foundations of the Cold War that led to the initial categor-
ization of a refugee have ebbed and flowed over the years, as 
has the implicit sense of persecution embodied in early post-
war use of the term. In fact, the term has come to be seen by 
many interested parties as simply a convenient tool to access 
settlement in a foreign territory.8 The possibility of refugees 
posing some kind of threat, either as Communist infiltrators 
at the height of the Cold War, or more recently as resource-
consuming unskilled labour, has evolved concurrently.9
Earlier conceptualizations of people displaced by war and 
trauma cloaked individuals in tragedy and despair.10 After 
the Allied victory in Europe, refugee advocates masterfully 
exploited images of suffering and impoverishment to cre-
ate a sensibility amongst the policy-makers and citizens in 
potential receiving countries that would facilitate the recep-
tion of refugees escaping the devastation on the Continent.11 
Caring for refugees was transformed into a virtuous and 
noble undertaking, one that demonstrated compassion and 
generosity. Some scholars have even declared that a coun-
try’s refugee policy defines its very character. In the words 
of Canadian academic Howard Adelman, “Refugee policy is 
the litmus test of the concept of justice in a society.”12
How states categorize migrant types has significant 
implications for how we understand the 1968 Czech move-
ment and the Canadian state’s response to crisis in the mid-
dle Cold War period. This article will show that the Czech 
refugees, long categorized as victims of Soviet violence and 
deserving of international humanitarian assistance, may 
not have actually fit this depiction and that, moreover, gov-
ernments of the day knew this. This is a critical connection 
for if we rethink “refugee” as a category then, by necessity, 
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we also need to review how nation-states deal with humani-
tarian crises.
Regardless of how much agency an individual possesses, 
the ultimate decision regarding their legal entry and resettle-
ment rests with the nation-state. It is generally assumed that 
states are motivated to act out of self-interest, to obtain a 
benefit or reward or to fulfill a particular objective.13 Some 
scholars emphasize the significance of public opinion while 
others point to geopolitics as critical determinants in deter-
mining the nature of refugee aid.14 In Canada, there is an 
additional line of argument that suggests the federal Liberal 
Party (which was in office at the time of the 1968 crisis) is 
the natural governing party of the country.15 This political 
success is seen by many as stemming from the Liberals’ 
historic ability to manipulate migration issues for electoral 
purposes.16 Its efforts in “courting the immigrant vote” are 
well documented.17 However, for a group to exercise influ-
ence on the political process they must be strategically 
important and this has never been the case for the Czech 
and Slovak communities in Canada. Dispersed across the 
country, often in sparsely populated districts, the commun-
ities’ relationship with the Canadian state has never been an 
intimate one. In fact, it has often been subject to intense sus-
picion because of fears that the community’s members were 
not committed to being “loyal Canadian subjects.”18 The 
rationale for extending millions of dollars in aid and reset-
tling twelve thousand Czechs following the Soviet invasion 
came from another source.
History of the Czechs and Slovaks in Canada
The earliest Czech and Slovak migrants were agricultural 
and manual labourers who came to Canada at the end of 
the 1880s as settlement expanded westward.19 By the end 
of the First World War there were only six thousand Czechs 
and Slovaks in all of Canada. However the population grew 
dramatically in the interwar period to thirty thousand by 
1931, largely due to turmoil at home and restricted access to 
the United States.20
In 1938, the community’s numbers increased slightly 
when the Canadian government resettled 1,200 Sudeten 
Germans from Czechoslovakia, encouraged by funding and 
political pressure from the British government in London.21 
In many ways, this earlier movement foreshadowed the 
decisions taken in 1968. Mackenzie King’s government was 
determined to admit only a select group of refugees: “Many 
of these refugees … were skilled craftsmen, professionals and 
farmers—exactly the kind of settlers Canada wanted …”22 
The end of the Second World War marked another convul-
sion in migration from Eastern Europe to Canada as thou-
sands of people fled oppressive, unstable regimes for oppor-
tunities overseas. The 1961 census recorded 73,061 Czechs 
and Slovaks in Canada, almost half of whom were born 
overseas. Significantly, 72.9 per cent of Eastern European 
immigrants who came to Canada between 1946 and 1961 
cited politics as the reason for their decision to migrate.23 
Tight border controls imposed after the Communist coup in 
1948 limited migration out of Czechoslovakia; however, the 
Canadian government did make a special effort to assist the 
“thousands of Czech officials caught on the wrong side of 
the Communist take-over.”24 This was both surprising given 
the government’s fear of Communist infiltrators and under-
standable considering the great sympathy with which offi-
cials regarded the most “Western” of the Eastern European 
states.25 Despite this historic affinity, the Cold War damaged 
ties between Canada and Czechoslovakia. Relations became 
so strained that at times even the most routine and admin-
istrative of matters could give rise to diplomatic tensions.26 
In 1954, members of the Czech community protested vigor-
ously because they believed that Canadian authorities were 
preventing their families from joining them. Frustrated 
officials in the Department of External Affairs blamed the 
Czech government for refusing to issue visas and lobbied 
their counterparts in Prague to be more open.27
By 1968, Czech-Canadian relations were in a holding 
pattern. Canada had started selling wheat to the Eastern 
bloc in 1956 but ideologically the two nations were far 
apart. However, when changes in party leadership brought 
Alexander Dubček to power (replacing Stalinist-loyal 
Antonin Novotny) and Czechoslovakia’s Communist lead-
ers began to experiment with the idea of “socialism with 
a human face,” Canadian officials became more hopeful. 
Excitement grew (both in Czechoslovakia and amongst 
observers in the Western bloc) as censorship rules were 
relaxed and a presidential amnesty was issued for all the vic-
tims of the Stalinist purges. There was a sense of real oppor-
tunity for change.28 The Soviets actually seemed prepared 
to allow some degree of liberalization until a group of intel-
lectuals presented an indictment of the previous two dec-
ades of Soviet rule titled “Two Thousand Words.” Incensed, 
the Soviet leadership decided to resort to violence to curb 
any further liberalization efforts.29 The Soviet Union, 
along with its Warsaw Pact allies, invaded Czechoslovakia 
on August 20, 1968. Thousands fled the country, includ-
ing many of the intellectuals, writers, and artists who 
had participated in the exciting, heady days of the Prague 
Spring.30 Others, caught abroad at the time of the invasion, 
waited to see what would happen next. The government in 
Prague soon became one of the most orthodox and repres-
sive Soviet satellites and many vacationers never returned 
home. Instead, they were joined by the 150,000 people who 
fled the country in the year following the invasion in search 
of resettlement  opportunities abroad. Twenty years later, 
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there was still one person crossing the border into Austria 
every four hours.31
The Canadian Reaction
Upon news of the invasion, Cabinet asked Prime Minister 
Trudeau to return from his holidays prematurely. Trudeau 
immediately agreed, offering to stop in London to discuss the 
situation with British prime minister Harold Wilson, but his 
ministers discouraged him. Cabinet wanted Trudeau to con-
sult with them before visiting with heads of state abroad.32 
Back in Ottawa, the prime minister led a response that was 
both cautious and strategic in its approach. Canada’s NATO 
membership meant it had to consider the possibility of a mil-
itary intervention if Soviet violence spread across Eastern 
Europe. The Canadian government wanted to avoid this situ-
ation so the government’s official statement carefully tried to 
denounce Soviet tactics while avoiding suggestions that an 
aggressive Western response was in the works. The govern-
ment condemned the invasion as “a flagrant breach of the 
principle of non-intervention” and called it a “tragedy for all 
people who prize human freedom and national independ-
ence.”33 The statement portrayed NATO’s “ultimate goal” as 
“seeking a durable East-West accommodation.”34
Many Czechoslovakians were frustrated by the reaction 
of the West to the invasion of their homeland. The intellec-
tual Ivan Svitak writes:
Among the international consequences of the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was the hypocritical rhetoric of Western liber-
als, who did not move a finger in the critical situation, because 
they were fascinated by a bridge-building policy toward the Soviet 
Union …. Another, and the worst, consequence was the détente 
policy which rewarded Soviet aggressive postures with far-reach-
ing concessions. The Soviet intervention worked in the short run, 
and history again seemed to confirm that the West has written 
off the Czechs and the other Central Europeans behind the Iron 
Curtain.35
The United States was alone in wanting to exploit the 
crisis to demonstrate NATO solidarity and commitments in 
Europe. To this end, it pushed the organization to broadcast 
a statement that would reaffirm its commitment to main-
taining current troop levels in Europe. Trudeau refused to 
go along.36 Shortly after assuming office in the spring of 
1968, his government had embarked upon a massive for-
eign policy review and he wanted to complete it before tak-
ing any new steps, or confirming any status quo positions, 
regarding Canada’s NATO membership.37 Nevertheless, 
the Soviet invasion required at least some consideration 
by Canadian officials about what Soviet actions meant for 
international peace and security, and Canadian diplomats 
immediately engaged with the broader implications of the 
crisis.
For the most part, Canadian officials interpreted the 
Soviet Union’s invasion as a sign of insecurity rather than 
belligerence. From his perch at the Canadian embassy in 
Moscow, Ambassador Robert Ford suggested that “it would 
be a mistake … to interpret the Soviet invasion in Czech 
as prelude to a more aggressive military or political policy 
in Europe.”38 This was in tune with Trudeau’s world view. 
While the prime minister was certainly not blind to the fail-
ings of Communism under Leonid Brezhnev, he was more 
sympathetic than many of his contemporaries to Soviet 
intentions. Instead of regarding their every act as evidence 
of aggressive expansion, Trudeau believed in respecting 
Soviet spheres of influence.39 This meant that Trudeau was 
unwilling to encourage or condone conflict (economic, pol-
itical, or ideological) with Soviet authorities. According to 
one historian: “Pierre Trudeau loathed totalitarianism and 
the repression it meant for its subject peoples … Yet Trudeau 
believed that in a world that was ideologically polarized, 
armed to the teeth and flirting with nuclear disaster, dia-
logue was preferable to confrontation.”40 These philosoph-
ical underpinnings and Trudeau’s belief in the legitimate 
authority of governments (elected or otherwise) shaped his 
perceptions of the Soviet Union and its aspirations in the 
international arena.
In dissecting the thinking behind the invasion, Canadian 
officials concluded that the Soviets were trying to prevent any 
further liberalization within the Warsaw Pact. A week and a 
half after the invasion, senior officials in the Department of 
External Affairs completed a detailed analysis of the recent 
Soviet activity, in which they referred to “the emotionalism 
which has clouded Soviet judgment throughout the Czech 
affair” and the Russians’ “extraordinary ignorance of the 
Czech realities.” The memo concluded that the Soviet “pos-
ition in East Europe is fundamentally weaker” because of 
the invasion and suggested, therefore, that the Soviet Union 
might become “less predictable.”41 Canadian diplomats 
worried about the state of affairs within both the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact generally in terms of the poten-
tial for greater conflict and violence. The Canadian govern-
ment therefore adopted a policy of being as “unprovocative 
as possible,” sensing that an “ideological breakup was taking 
place in Eastern Europe.”42 The media and the Czech and 
Slovak communities in Canada called upon the government 
to pay attention to the plight of those caught behind the 
invasion. Ottawa resisted. Taking issue with editorials in the 
Globe and Mail in particular, officials told Mitchell Sharp, 
the Secretary of State for External Affairs: “We can facilitate 
the entry of Czech refugees to Canada; we cannot help them 
escape from Czechoslovakia. To pretend we can would only 
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encourage false hopes and in fact make such escape more 
difficult.”43 As a result, the larger refugee situation and the 
Canadian response to it took some time to develop. Only 
when population flows into neighbouring Austria failed to 
abate weeks after the invasion did Canada look at the crisis 
from a more compassionate perspective.
Officials in the Department of External Affairs were 
the first to sound the alarm about a possible humanitarian 
crisis. On Labour Day weekend, recalled by some as “warm 
and sunshiny,” Mitchell Sharp convened a gathering of sen-
ior bureaucrats from his department and a select few from 
the Department of Manpower and Immigration to discuss 
the “deteriorating situation.”44 The numbers of Czechs leav-
ing the country continued to grow daily, and Sharp worried 
whether Austria was in a position to continue to absorb the 
flow from across the borders. In the recollections of some 
participants, the decision to provide refugee status to the 
Czechs came directly from the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs at this meeting.45 One official explains: “There was 
no cabinet memorandum, nor indeed any discussion among 
Ministers. Mitchell Sharp made the decision and I can only 
assume made his peace with the Prime Minister and Mr. 
MacEachen (Minister of Manpower and Immigration) 
after the fact.”46 External Affairs may have led the initial 
charge but determining the logistics for implementing the 
special program was left to the devices of senior officials in 
Manpower and Immigration.
Offering Assistance
After External Affairs made the decision to examine the 
refugee situation, immigration officials turned their atten-
tion to reports about the refugees themselves. There was tre-
mendous reluctance on the part of Canadian authorities to 
refer to the Czech refugees as “freedom fighters.” In fact, a 
number of scholars have pointed to how different the Czech 
refugees were from earlier movements. In her work on the 
operations of the UNHCR in this period Louise Holborn 
notes the difference between the “68ers” and earlier refu-
gees from Czechoslovakia. The group was “composed of 
much younger people—students, teachers, scientists, jour-
nalists and doctors. Many of them spoke English, French 
and German. They were in possession of valid passports, 
and often had financial means.”47 Similarly, Gil Loescher 
has observed that “most of the people did not seek to apply 
for asylum immediately but preferred to wait and see how 
the situation evolved in Czechoslovakia before deciding on 
a course of action.” International organizations hesitated to 
label the Czechs as refugees for fear of creating an “artificial 
refugee problem.”48 It would look bad for everyone involved 
if somebody labelled a refugee opted to return home rather 
than be resettled. Canadian officials examined reports from 
Vienna, which emphasized the migrants’ levels of education 
and employment qualifications, and began to think about 
how the country could best respond to the situation.49 The 
key seemed to lie in the potential for the refugees to become 
important contributors to the Canadian economy.
The discussion around the economic potential of the 
Czech refugees was rooted in the broader shift in Canadian 
immigration policy in this period. Concerned about 
Canada’s competitive edge, the federal government began 
to develop labour market policies in the early 1960s to pro-
mote the growth of professional services, entrepreneurial 
ventures, and lucrative industries such as manufactur-
ing and production.50 A large supply of skilled labour was 
required. Canadian universities were growing exponen-
tially, producing thousands of new graduates annually, but 
still the government remained concerned. One solution was 
to increase immigration numbers. This new philosophy 
was enshrined in the 1967 Immigration Act, which pro-
vided for a points system to determine eligible migrants to 
Canada. The selection system that was introduced stressed 
skills, education, and adaptability and removed discrimina-
tory clauses against formerly penalized areas such as Asia. 
The very restructuring and renaming of the Department 
of Citizenship and Immigration to the Department of 
Manpower and Immigration showed the emphasis the gov-
ernment was placing on migrants as a source of labour. 
Recruiting skilled migrants was a competitive business. As 
Ather Akbari explains, there was a “general relative inter-
national scarcity of highly trained manpower” and “eco-
nomic indicators within Canada suggested that the postwar 
economic boom was over” so migrants did not necessarily 
see the country as a destination of choice.51 As a result, the 
government was determined to use every opportunity to 
recruit skilled workers to Canada and the Czech crisis pro-
vided a nice opening, if it could be handled properly.
The Canadian government was drawn to the possibilities 
of acquiring highly skilled labour with the Czech refugees 
but at the same time, the archival records show that one of 
the major concerns for the government was managing the 
number of potential refugees. Officials in External Affairs 
cautioned that “political developments in Czechoslovakia 
may result in a much larger movement.”52 In other words, 
depending on how Moscow treated Dubček and what hap-
pened with border controls, the possibility of a larger exo-
dus remained. In fact, Ottawa thought Moscow was “con-
tent to leave the borders fairly open so that liberal elements 
could eliminate themselves from the picture.”53 Canada was 
therefore loath to announce any grand resettlement scheme 
even though officials could barely disguise their interest in 
extending a helping hand to some of the Czech refugees, 
for they discerned tremendous economic potential in the 
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highly skilled and well-educated numbers that were leaving 
the country.
Trudeau’s government needed a strategy that would avoid 
encouraging a mass exodus, which would upset the Soviets 
and liberal elements in Czechoslovakia, and yet would allow 
it to obtain the highly skilled refugees it so brazenly coveted. 
Canadian policy was to be selective, designed to facilitate 
the movement of only particular refugees.54 Clever offi-
cials subsequently decided to apply the refugee definition to 
individuals who were outside of the country at the time of 
the invasion. This was a creative (mis)use of the legal def-
inition of a Convention Refugee in order to give Canada’s 
project in Austria greater legitimacy. Given that Canada 
only signed the Convention in 1969, officials had a fair bit 
of room to manoeuver on this front. One immigration offi-
cer recalls that he “had no problem with fudging the def-
inition because the quality of the people who were asking 
to immigrate was so high.”55 Ironically, Allan MacEachen, 
the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, referred to 
the importance of selecting “true refugees” but the govern-
ment’s approach revealed a willingness to create an inflated 
sense of humanitarian need in the interest of obtaining 
high-quality migrants.56
In all of the discussions about whether to assist the Czech 
refugees, the precedent set by the Hungarian refugees in 
1956 loomed large. At the time, Prime Minister St. Laurent’s 
Liberal government had provided free transportation to 
those who wanted to come to Canada and in 1968 Allan 
MacEachen pushed his colleagues to take similar action. 
There was a great deal of reluctance. Some ministers pointed 
out that the Czechs seemed to be more financially stable 
than many immigrants coming to Canada. They proposed 
to offer loans rather than grants but MacEachen accused 
them of hypocrisy. He maintained that it would be “mor-
ally and politically indefensible to draw such a distinction 
between current Czech refugees and those from Hungary in 
1956.”57 Cabinet eventually concurred and agreed to offer 
free resettlement services to the Czechs, placing them in the 
same category as the Hungarian refugees who had received 
generous financial and moral support twelve years earlier.
On September 6, the government announced a limited 
program whereby it would issue visas for those Czechs 
interested in migrating to Canada according to the “relaxed 
standards traditionally offered to refugees.”58 Normal 
requirements for sponsorship, potential employment, and 
financial assistance were waived. The government also set 
aside an initial $2 million to cover the travel and settlement 
costs for an expected two thousand refugees. Immigration 
officials decided to use the nine selection factors that were 
inscribed in the 1967 Immigration Act as a guideline for 
selecting refugees. As one official explains, this gave “the 
selection officers a good deal of discretionary power.”59 
The refugees Canada selected for resettlement were seen as 
“‘good material’: predominantly young and well educated.”60 
Gerald Dirks and Michael Lanphier have both commented 
on the “high quality” of refugees that Canada recruited dur-
ing this movement: 19 per cent of the household heads had 
more than twelve years of formal education and 33 per cent 
were either skilled or professional workers.61 Not wanting 
to risk the “survival of the Czech intelligentsia”62 Canada 
declared from the start that its policy was to “accept but not 
recruit refugees.”63 However, the reality was that Canada 
was very interested in recruiting refugees and it proceeded 
to do so in Austria, in a manner that was hidden from both 
the Canadian public and Czech officials in Prague. The 
government was so successful in this vein that by October 
1968 officials in External Affairs were able to report that the 
Czech government in Prague appreciated the “humanitar-
ian, non-aggressive approach” and “accepted this as a con-
crete indication of (Canada’s) moral support.”64
The day before making a public announcement about the 
special program for Czech refugees, Allan MacEachen asked 
his cabinet colleagues what they thought of having a team 
go to Europe “for the purpose of contacting refugees who 
were highly qualified in scientific and technological fields 
and who may be interested in coming to Canada.”65 The 
politicians who remembered the success of Jack Pickersgill’s 
trip to Vienna at the time of the Hungarian Revolution 
embraced this suggestion. However, External Affairs was 
opposed to the plan, declaring that “it had the appearance 
of a gratuitous political gesture which could be taken by the 
Russians as a desire on our part to make “cold war” propa-
ganda.”66 Despite this opposition, ambitions to secure the 
best talent before rivals like Australia and the United States 
could do so propelled the mission forward.67
In due course, a special delegation, headed by Andrew 
Thompson (Member of Parliament for Toronto–Dovercourt) 
and including representatives from the Canada Council, the 
National Research Council, and other professional bodies, 
was dispatched to Vienna. When questioned in the House 
of Commons about the ethics of taking the “cream” of the 
movement, MacEachen defended the team’s mission, argu-
ing that everyone was welcome to apply and the team was 
to “assist the specially qualified Czechoslovakians who may 
want to come to Canada by exploring with them the oppor-
tunities that are available in the country. There is no inten-
tion … of taking any exclusive attitude toward any group 
of refugees.”68 Canada needed to sell itself and the special 
mission to Vienna was the best way to do it. Canada was well 
aware that migrants in Austria were gathering intelligence 
from each other about where the best place to resettle would 
be and learned to evaluate the many options that Western 
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countries, desirous of their talent, offered them. One immi-
gration officer recalls, “They met other like-minded refugees 
in Vienna and talked about ‘destination options’ and which 
country had the ‘better offers.’”69 Humanitarian assistance 
was a competitive venture. Australia accepted six thou-
sand refugees while the United States facilitated the entry 
of just over eleven thousand. Given Canada’s comparative 
size, it seems that its officials excelled at recruiting potential 
migrants.
Interest in securing the best migrants prompted the 
government to act quickly, and traditional concerns that 
marked earlier movements, such as security and threats of 
Communist infiltration, were generally considered in hind-
sight.70 The initial flow of refugees into Austria dwindled by 
October and Cabinet began to discuss ways of winding down 
the program. However immigration officials, who continued 
to monitor the situation in Vienna, noticed that very little 
of the two million dollars the government had set aside to 
assist the refugees had been used, so they began to envision 
ways to expand the program. They turned their attention 
to the possibility of enticing Czech students to come to 
Canadian universities and to facilitate their integration by 
providing language training. If any money was left over, 
officials argued that it could be disbursed to other Czech 
refugees for educational purposes.71 This was far above what 
immigrants normally received in support from the govern-
ment; however, Allan MacEachen lobbied for this expanded 
policy, arguing that Canada had a special commitment to 
the Czech refugees because “they had been specially invited 
and assisted.”72 It seems the government wanted to continue 
to extend special invitations under the guise of alleviating a 
humanitarian crisis. The original two thousand spaces allo-
cated for Czech resettlement multiplied to twelve thousand 
by the spring of 1969, in large part because the educated and 
skilled refugees proved to be such “good material.”
Coming to Canada
The relative affluence of the Czech refugees is one of the 
many factors that points to the problems with the conven-
tional and overly romantic depiction of a refugee as desti-
tute and helpless. Most of the Czech refugees who came to 
Canada paid their own way or opted to take out loans to 
fund their voyage. The first to arrive flew into Toronto on 
September 15, 1968. They consisted of a group of 203 refu-
gees, most of whom had friends and family in Canada.73 
The Globe and Mail celebrated their arrival, profiling one 
“blond girl” in particular. According to the glowing article, 
she was “22, pretty, single and an architecture student. She 
wants to continue her studies in Canada.”74 The group was 
described in radiant terms: “as well dressed as any plane-
load of passengers getting off flights in Toronto, Montreal 
or New York” and “according to Immigration Department 
officials they include a small gold mine of talent.”75 The 
first group of two hundred plus refugees included medical 
doctors, dentists, fifteen engineers, and two television set 
designers. Many of the refugees settled in Ontario although 
a significant proportion also made their way to the prairie 
provinces of Manitoba, Alberta, and Sasktachewan where 
earlier Czech immigrants had established themselves.
By all accounts, the integration of the Czech refugees 
occurred relatively smoothly. It seems that many sectors 
of society participated in their resettlement, as the Annual 
Report of the Department of Manpower and Immigration for 
1968–69 draws special attention to the role that private organ-
izations and individuals played in helping with the arrival of 
the Czech refugees.76 Behind the scenes, government offi-
cials continued to worry about the impact of the refugee 
movement on diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia but 
for the most part the government’s decisions did not affect 
the daily, lived experience of the Czechs in Canada.77 The 
other positive indicator was the high employment rate for 
the refugees even in the immediate period following their 
arrival. At the end of October, the Globe and Mail reported 
that over eight hundred refugees had found work, almost 
half in their own professions.78 A longitudinal study pre-
pared by government found that the unemployment rate for 
the Czech migrants, after three years of being in Canada, 
was just above the national average (quite extraordinary 
considering the short time in which the refugees had been 
participating in the Canadian job market) and “a certain but 
only moderate occupation deflection in comparison with 
jobs held in Czechoslovakia.”79
One particularly telling statistic about the success of the 
program is how few Czechs returned to Czechoslovakia. 
Almost a year after the migrants arrived, only six hundred 
of the twelve thousand refugees had gone back.80 When 
individuals did decide to leave, the most vigorous attempts 
to dissuade them came from ardent anti-Communist 
Czech community organizations. The Masaryk Memorial 
Institute, which had been instrumental in settling thou-
sands of Czech refugees in Ontario, tried to engage the gov-
ernment in preventing departures. In a lengthy petition, the 
Institute claimed that these refugees “made their decision 
to return to Czechoslovakia (during) a momentary feeling 
of depression and would probably be very sorry a few weeks 
after returning.” They blamed Canadian authorities for rais-
ing false “expectations as to schooling and jobs and we are 
afraid that perhaps the problem of starting a new life in this 
country are not stressed strongly enough by our officials in 
Vienna.”81 Officials in Ottawa refused to curtail anyone’s 
return home, even if it meant a possible propaganda victory 
for the Eastern bloc. For the government, the vast majority 
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who were determined to stay in Canada was victory enough. 
And as the political scientist Reg Whitaker has noted, given 
that it cost the government less than $1,000 to resettle each 
refuge, officials were probably quite pleased with the return 
on their investment.82 The only disconcerting element to all 
of this was that the movement was presented to the Canadian 
public as a humanitarian one, not a self-serving one.
Conclusions
As the first group of Czech refugees prepared to leave for 
their new homes, the Canadian representative in Vienna 
told them, “You have all reached a difficult and momen-
tous decision … Canada is glad to offer you a new home, 
but is saddened by the circumstances that have brought you 
to this step.” He wished them “peace, contentment and a 
goodly measure of success, and especially may you establish 
a firm basis for the future of your children, in my country, 
which is so proud to welcome you!”83 From the moment 
they conceived of a special program to assist Czech refugees, 
Canadian officials hoped that they would stay for the long 
term and make important contributions to the economic 
and social life of the country.84 These hopes translated into 
public statements that reassured Canadians that aiding the 
Czech refugees did not pose a threat to their economic wel-
fare or political security and that the offer of relief was indeed 
a noble and virtuous undertaking.85 It was a carefully con-
structed charade, for Canadian officials also wanted to avoid 
embarrassing the Soviet Union during the crisis. There were 
many reasons for this subtle game of doublespeak but there 
is no doubt that the government communicated one mes-
sage and acted on another.86
Politicians and scholars alike consistently reference the 
aid that Canada provided the 1956 victims of the Hungarian 
Revolution as a hallmark of generosity and selflessness.87 
No similar mythology exists around the Czech refugee 
movement of 1968. Scholars have ignored it, as have the 
participants. Neither Mitchell Sharp nor Pierre Trudeau 
mention the movement in their memoirs. By contrast, Jack 
Pickersgill describes his intervention in the Hungarian 
crisis as the highlight of his time with the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration.88 Perhaps it is difficult to 
be self-congratulatory when a movement serves ulterior 
motives. While the government spoke of saving refugees 
from “fear and persecution,”89 the decision to resettle refu-
gees from Czechoslovakia was much more pragmatic than 
the rhetoric of the day implied. The Czech refugees were 
depicted as victims of the Soviet violence when, in actu-
ality, Canadian officials were concerned less with Soviet 
behaviour and more with how they could secure skilled 
migrants for themselves. The “success” of the movement 
was measured not by how many lives were saved or how 
many families were reunited, but rather by employment 
rates and income levels.
It was also measured by how Canada fared vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union in the international community. The nature 
of Canada’s response to the 1968 invasion allowed it to 
maintain polite relations with the Soviet bloc so the spirit 
of détente could continue to grow all the while obtaining 
talented migrants under the guise of humanitarian aid. This 
required a liberal interpretation of what a refugee was.
In the case of the 1968 Prague Spring refugees, the 
Canadian government conceptualized of the refugees in 
terms of the new Cold War atmosphere so they were predis-
posed to avoid overly “victimizing” the refugees. This would 
have embarrassed the Soviet Union and possibly created a 
more volatile situation in Eastern Europe. The government 
was critical but not vengeful. When officials in Vienna began 
to report on the strengths of the refugees, specifically their 
professional qualifications and education levels, Canadian 
politicians realized that they had an opportunity to recruit 
thousands of skilled workers. The resettlement program 
served two purposes: it alleviated a humanitarian crisis and 
it allowed the country to benefit economically and socially 
from the influx of thousands of talented individuals. The 
Canadian government downplayed potential security risks 
and did not hesitate to manipulate the idea of a refugee for 
political and economic ends. The only victim was the trad-
itional conception of what it meant to be a refugee in need 
of assistance.
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